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SPILLOVER CONVERSATION 
 
 
Susan Bibler Coutin 
University of California, Irvine 
 
Sean Mallin 
University of California, Irvine 
 
Sally Engle Merry 
New York University 
 
Interview: Technologies of Truth, Law, and Inequalities 
 
As part of the Political and Legal Anthropology Review (PoLAR) virtual issue, Law and 
Inequalities: Global and Local, Digital Editorial Fellow Sean Mallin [SM] interviewed Susan 
Bibler Coutin [SBC] and Sally Engle Merry [SEM] regarding the trajectories of their work in 
relation to law and inequalities.1 In doing so, their discussion covered a number of conceptual 
issues related to developments in socio-legal research more generally. 
 
******* 
 
SM [to SBC and SEM]: Thank you for agreeing to this interview. My questions try to bring 
some of the themes in your joint American Ethnological Society (AES)/Association for Political 
and Legal Anthropology (APLA) Presidential Address last year, entitled “Technologies of Truth 
in the Anthropology of Conflict,” into conversation with the theme of the 50th anniversary 
meeting of the Law and Society Association, which is “Law and Inequalities: Global and Local.”  
 
Your Presidential Address offers insights into some of the questions and challenges, both global 
and local, facing scholars today. We wonder if you both could start with a few words about how 
you think further study of technologies of truth—especially in contexts of the “new governance,” 
as you call it—can shape how scholars in law and the social sciences approach the study of 
inequality? 
 
SBC: Thank you for posing this question. As Sally and I developed at greater length in our 
article in American Ethnologist, technologies of truth associated with new forms of governance 
produce versions of reality that are deemed definitive but that also reflect the perspectives of 
more powerful groups. In our article, we define new governance as “a shift from a command-
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and-control strategy of governance to collaborative, consensus-building discussions focused on 
problem solving and improvement…. In contrast to earlier systems, which relied on rules and 
punishments, new governance relies extensively on ‘soft law’ in that it shapes behavior by 
establishing standards; requiring individuals, groups, corporations, and even nations to report on 
how they have met them; and comparing results” (Merry and Coutin 2014:2).  
 
Technologies of truth are essentially systems of measurement, evaluation, and assessment. 
Members of marginalized groups are often the subjects or objects of these systems, rather than 
the designers of these technologies. As a result, modes of assessment may employ criteria or 
collect data that does not reflect their social realities. For example, an unauthorized immigrant 
who is seeking status in the United States may be asked to provide documentation of continuous 
presence in the United States even though the very condition of being undocumented, especially 
if coupled with other forms of disadvantage, such as being a domestic violence victim, may 
preclude generating the sorts of evidence (pay stubs, bank statements, school records) that are 
required.   
 
To me, one of the most interesting issues that Sally and I began to explore is whether these new 
forms of governance are producing new sorts of legal subjects. Immigration scholars have 
highlighted the degree to which U.S. immigration law is increasingly producing liminal statuses 
that are equivalent neither to being undocumented nor to lawful permanent residency or 
citizenship. Immigrants who have been granted temporary protected status or deferred action do 
not enjoy the same legal rights as lawful permanent residents. They face travel restrictions, they 
cannot petition for their family members, their eligibility for public benefits is limited, they are 
not on a pathway to citizenship, and their ultimate legal fate is uncertain. Proposals for 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform would create a new liminal status known as “Registered 
Provisional Immigrant” status, but this would be linked to the United States’ ability to meet 
certain border enforcement “triggers,” and also would require applicants to maintain a clean 
criminal record and comply with other immigration-related requirements. So, new technologies 
of truth also entail the creation of new forms of liminal subjectivity. 
 
SEM: One of the issues that Susan and I are centrally concerned with is the power embedded in 
constructing categories and identities through law and systems of measurement. Counting the 
number of people who have experienced violence in interpersonal relationships, for example, 
provides knowledge about violations that determines who receives help and who does not as well 
as how and where the state chooses to intervene. Interrogating who is developing the categories 
and carrying out the enumeration is a critical part of exploring how these technologies exercise 
power. Those who control the counting control the knowledge. In effect, they define the problem 
and its solution.  
  
The knowledge production of quantification is largely the work of experts, typically those with 
education and experience in data collection and analysis. Those being measured are rarely if ever 
consulted about the relevant categories of counting and modes of analysis. Thus, through this 
subtle process of quantification, inequalities in social position are translated into inequalities in 
how the social world is understood.  
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Since this knowledge is increasingly the basis for policy and decision-making, the current 
enthusiasm for evidence-based governance can exacerbate inequalities. On the other hand, 
quantification can also expose inequalities in a particularly powerful way. This is a technology 
with power that can both exacerbate or diminish inequality. It is available, albeit unequally, to 
those who are able to harness it.  
 
SM: You both bring up really interesting points about the production of new legal subjects 
through technologies of truth. In a way, it reminds us of some of your earlier work on working-
class engagements with local courts (Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness 
Among Working-Class Americans) and the struggles of Salvadoran immigrants as they negotiate 
U.S. immigration law (Legalizing Moves: Salvadoran Immigrants’ Struggle for US Residency). 
Both books underline the importance of examining how people understand and experience law. 
We were wondering if you could talk about the place of earlier work on legal consciousness in 
light of more current interest in legal subjectivity? Do you see legal subjectivity as distinct from 
legal consciousness? How so?  
 
SBC: This is an important question. Socio-legal scholars often use the term legal consciousness 
to refer to attitudes toward the law, for example, to whether individuals see law as majestic, as 
accessible, as establishing rules that individuals can manipulate, as beyond reach, and so forth. 
Some turn to Patty Ewick and Susan Silbey’s book, The Common Place of Law, as a key 
resource in thinking about legal consciousness. Additionally, the notion of legal consciousness 
has been important for scholars who are interested in disputing and particularly in whether or not 
disputants are willing to turn to law (versus informal mechanisms or even “lumping it”) to 
resolve their dispute. 
 
When I was working on Legalizing Moves, I had been very influenced by Foucault and therefore 
was interested in analyzing the set of practices that constituted individuals as legal subjects 
within immigration categories, particularly given that immigration law has been made pertinent 
to an increasing number of contexts outside of formal legal settings (e.g., applying for a job, 
applying for college, seeking medical care, opening a bank account). My thinking was that the 
understandings of law that were articulated by such subjects reflected this set of practices and 
thus provided insight into the workings of immigration law.  
 
By “understandings” I did not mean individuals’ attitudes toward law or their “consciousness,” 
but rather their explanations of law’s functioning. So, for example, Central Americans with 
pending immigration cases in the United States seemed to see status as inhering in documents 
rather than in persons. This interpretation of law seemed to reflect their experience of being 
asked for documents, and therefore was accurate, even though it differed in key ways from that 
of attorneys and officials who saw documents as evidence of status rather than as status itself, 
and who were also correct (so this was not a case of law “on the books” differing from law “in 
action,” but rather of law itself being multidimensional). For me, focusing on subjectification and 
subjectivity was a way of understanding law as a disciplinary system. 
 
SEM: I agree with Susan that this is an important question. The concept of legal consciousness 
has been very productive, but it is also a difficult and confusing term. It has Marxist origins, 
developing from the question of why people go along with systems of inequality in which they 
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are disadvantaged. It has also been used to simply describe attitudes toward the law. My use of 
the term is closer to legal subjectivity: how a person’s sense of self is shaped by law. Seeing 
oneself as endowed with rights is a dimension of legal consciousness. Thus, legal consciousness 
describes the way an individual conceives of his/her relationship to the law and how that shapes 
who he/she is.  
 
For example, the battered women I met in my research in Hawai‘i were encouraged to use the 
courts to prosecute their abusers. This meant forging a new relationship to the law as capable of 
endowing the survivor with rights. Legal consciousness changes with experience. If a person 
turns to the courts for help with domestic violence, for example, and the court responds with a 
powerful and effective intervention, the person may change her legal consciousness as a result of 
this experience, deciding that she has a right not to be hit. On the other hand, if the court treats 
the complaint dismissively, the person’s legal consciousness may shift to the view that these 
rights are weak or meaningless and that she cannot contest the abuse she suffers.   
 
Legal consciousness is different from legal culture in that it is held by individuals and shaped by 
experience. However, it is a product of legal culture in that it is acquired from surrounding 
cultural assumptions about law, rights, and justice. Thus, the individual acquires a legal 
consciousness from his culture, but adapts and changes this understanding of himself with 
experience. Since culture is not a simple, homogeneous system but a repertoire of ideas, 
practices, and strategies, it offers opportunities for reevaluation and change with experience.  
Finally, I also differentiate legal consciousness from legal mobilization, which is the use of law 
as a technique of social action. In practice, these concepts are frequently related, but it is useful 
to keep them analytically distinct.  
 
SM: Your AES/APLA address taps into the growing interest in anthropology on questions of 
transparency and bureaucracy. One way to approach these questions is through engaging with so-
called experts in the classic mode of “studying up” which, in a way, involves extending the 
analytic of “legal subjectivity” to those creating or enforcing law. What suggestions do you have 
for scholars interested in studying law and policy, especially when some of the actors involved 
may be difficult to reach? How do you think critical engagement with expertise contributes to 
understanding inequality? 
 
SEM: This question addresses two critical issues in the contemporary study of law and 
anthropology. The first is the importance of expertise in controlling not only law and its use, but 
also the production of knowledge about law and governance more generally. In my work on 
quantification, it is clear that governance is increasingly dependent on metrics, which are 
produced by the same practices of categorization and generalization that underlie the operation 
of law. Yet, these processes of commensuration and categorization are even more opaque to the 
public than the classification and analysis that take place within the law.  
 
Unequal power in constructing such knowledge contributes in significant ways to maintaining 
inequalities. It is typically elites who construct measures and often the poor and marginal who 
are the targets of counting. The latter generally have little say about what is counted and how it is 
classified. We need scholarly research on the ways quantified knowledge is produced and its 
underlying cultural and interpretive work as well as greater skepticism and sophistication about 
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numbers by those who use indicators. I am finishing a book that addresses these questions, but 
there is a great deal more work that needs to be done.  
 
The second critical question concerns access. As anthropologists shift from studying small 
communities that are relatively powerless to focusing on elites, access becomes far more 
problematic. I have encountered several cases recently in which anthropologists studying 
powerful institutions and actors had great difficulty getting access to individuals and institutional 
settings. Even if an anthropologist is allowed to attend meetings, this does not mean she will 
have access to private, informal conversations. This kind of research on bureaucracies and 
governing institutions is of critical importance in understanding core anthropological problems 
such as inequality and power. There are no easy answers here beyond persistence and luck, but it 
is an issue we need to confront.   
 
SBC: Additionally, of course, it is important to recognize that “up” and “down” are quite 
complicated and that there are multiple forms of expertise. For example, a paralegal may hold 
tremendous expertise regarding the practice of immigration law, an undocumented immigrant 
who now works as a janitor may have studied theology in his or her country of origin, and (and, 
this is a classic law and society idea) law can be created and enforced through the ongoing 
practices of the individuals who are the targets of policies.  
 
Regarding the issue of reach, I have found that individuals in powerful positions have been 
willing to meet and talk with me when the focus of my research turns out to be near and dear to 
them. For instance, at a time when the Salvadoran government was attempting to forge new 
relationships with Salvadorans living in the United States, high-level Salvadoran officials were 
willing to meet with me to share their perspectives on the Salvadoran immigrant community 
here. Likewise, high-level US officials were willing to talk to me about policy innovations 
regarding Central American immigrants. One challenge is that if one is attempting to reach 
multiple groups and sectors, particularly in different geographic locations, then it can be hard to 
access the sorts of informal conversations and settings that Sally refers to above. Sometimes, 
gaining more in-depth access to one group or sector can preclude working with or entering 
another. 
 
Regarding law and inequality, one important contribution of conducting anthropological research 
in powerful settings is that it quickly becomes clear that the actors in these settings are complex 
persons who often have good intentions and who may share some of the training and theoretical 
vocabulary of anthropologists and other scholars. I remember, for example, when a Salvadoran 
official pointed out to me that El Salvador had become transnational and that the state had to 
redefine itself accordingly. From outside of powerful settings, it may appear that powerful actors 
either have too much agency (e.g., that they can set policies as desired) or almost none (if 
policies are attributed to structures). Examining expertise helps to shed light on the forms that 
action (and inaction) takes, and the roles of technologies, records, forms and material histories in 
shaping or channeling law and policy. 
 
SM: You both raise some interesting points about how anthropology and socio-legal studies can 
illuminate important power dynamics, particularly as law interacts with forms of knowledge, 
“objective” standards being some such form.  
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To conclude our interview, I would like to ask you both about the use of “scientific” methods 
and research in law. There is a long history in which law has been viewed as (or aspired to be) a 
science. This view of law was critiqued by the legal realists and later by a range of sociolegal 
scholars. The current situation you describe in your address seems less about a return to this view 
of law as science and more about law engaging in new ways with science or scientific methods 
such as statistics. Could you talk a bit more about how you both see this relationship between 
law and science—either law as science or law’s use of science or something distinctly different? 
What new problems do you see being posed by this relationship?  
 
SEM: I would like to shift the question a bit. I share the legal realist view that law is not a 
science and that it does rely on science to some extent. But, I think one of the interesting features 
of law is the way it works in ways that are parallel to science, specifically to statistics. Scientific 
knowledge, including statistical knowledge, consists of ordering the world into categories and 
patterns of categories. These are of course subject to debate and change. Law similarly, but 
through a different process, is continually engaged in constructing categories and in assigning 
cases to these categories. Like science, these categories are arranged into patterns that provide 
explanations, in our case of social life. Thus, both are engaged in knowledge production as a 
central activity and use processes of comparison and systematization to do so. However, the 
source of authority is somewhat different, with science claiming its credibility based on facts and 
law on the logic of the categories.   
 
Bruno Latour has usefully compared processes of legal decision-making with scientific 
discovery, but it seems to me that this is a complicated question that warrants careful attention. 
For example, the processes vary depending on which part of the system one considers; it does 
not make sense to compare elite appellate courts with everyday scientific laboratories. There are 
clearly processes of producing truth, including through rules of evidence, in both law and 
science. Comparing and contrasting these processes is an important project for legal 
anthropologists, particularly as claims are made that law is an empirically based field as 
articulated by the empirical legal studies project. Examining law as a cultural system with its 
own logics about how to construct knowledge seems an important project and one that opens up 
the law for further critical scrutiny.  
 
SBC: I agree with Sally. Whether or not we define law as a science, the tools that Science and 
Technology Studies (STS) used for studying science sociologically can also be applied to the 
study of law and legal processes. It is possible to examine how truth claims are formulated in 
particular legal contexts, what counts as evidence, the logic of assembling a file in a particular 
fashion, which aspects of documents are deemed important for particular purposes, how 
documents and files circulate, and the various sorts of expertise that are created, deployed, and 
assessed in legal settings.   
 
Importantly, though, the phenomena that Sally and I analyzed in our piece are not only legal in 
nature. They also are what we’ve referred to as techniques of new governance, that is, forms of 
measurement designed in part to shape behavior by establishing metrics and standards. Thus, 
according to the memo through which it was created, the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival 
program (DACA) identifies immigrants who are considered to be a low enforcement priority due 
to their age when they entered the country, the many years they lived in the United States, and 
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their educational achievements. To determine whether DACA requestors qualify, adjudicators 
have had to determine what counts as evidence of continuous presence, and whether 
circumstantial evidence will be accepted as proof of meeting the DACA guidelines. As I 
mentioned above, a new problem that is posed by studying the ways that claims are constructed 
and evaluated is to identify the sorts of subjects are being created within these knowledge 
systems as well as how these subjects may contrast those of liberal law.   
 
SM: Thanks for the thought-provoking responses. As you both show, questions about the 
relationship between law and inequality cross jurisdictions and scales, from legal aid clinics to 
the offices of the United Nations. The “technologies of truth” that you highlight in your 
AES/APLA Presidential Address allow for the movement of the “new governance” practices into 
new areas of social and legal life. You also show how ethnography can be a powerful tool in 
revealing how these processes have intended and unintended consequences, including 
unanticipated dilemmas that emerge when categories fail. Yours is a powerful call for more 
empirical research into the role of law in addressing and perpetuating inequalities, both local and 
global. Thank you again for speaking with us. 
 
                                                
Notes 
 
1 Many thanks to Kate Henne and Stacy Topouzova for their assistance in developing questions 
for this interview. Recommended citation: Coutin, Susan Bibler, Sean Mallin, and Sally Engle 
Merry. “Technologies of Truth, Law, and Inequalities.” Interview. PoLAR: Political and Legal 
Anthropology Online, 12 June 2014, http://www.polaronline.org/virtual-issues/interview-coutin-
merry/ 
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